Reconsidering the. Robustness of. Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Lessons from the Arab Spring. Eva Bellin. Valeriia Gladkaia, učo Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons Author Eva Bellin; Book or Journal Comparative Politics; Vol. ROA is still valid in explaining the Arab Spring. “the coercive apparatus capacity and will + the level of political mobilization are decisive”.

Author: Maugor Kazragis
Country: Papua New Guinea
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Video
Published (Last): 14 February 2011
Pages: 82
PDF File Size: 16.27 Mb
ePub File Size: 5.10 Mb
ISBN: 461-8-24195-251-7
Downloads: 17121
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Tojin

Showing of 26 references.

International Security 24, 2: Leave a Comment Click here to cancel reply. The latter will no doubt be a game changer for the longevity of authoritarian regimes worldwide from now on.

The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East : Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective

In fact, the affair explains the anomalous 9. Conversely, the entrenchment of the Interior Ministry and police is reinforced by the immediate aftermath of the revolts.

In Tunisia, police officers worked more than 12 hours a day, earning less than the wages of bus driver.

Due to the opaque nature of security organs, information can be difficult to obtain; cases like Libya, with its many local militias, Saudi Arabia, with its royal divisions, and Bahrain, with its outsourced mercenaries, defy consistent analysis. In fewer words, a history of inter-organ competition followed by a unique instance of regime weakness persuades one party—in this case, the army—to defect.

Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Midd by Magdolin Harmina on Prezi

CiteULike uses cookies, some of which may already have been set. The role of the tunisian military in the post-bourguiba era. The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Nassif effectively summarizes the polarizing implications of this event: In Egypt, the specific incidents have been quite different but the outcomes are similar.


Setting up reading intentions help you organise your course reading. Accessed February 22, In fact, coup-proofing literature establishes that Arab regimes deliberately and uniquely constructed parallel militaries to counterweight the regular armed forces, which they saw as sources of potential coups.

Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring

By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy PolicyTerms of Serviceand Dataset License. Likes beta This copy of the article hasn’t been liked by robudtness yet.

Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Have you read this? Lessons from the Arab Spring. Hence, by substantially varying the conditions under which security forces chose to repress, sectarian cases disable comparison with cases like Egypt and Tunisia. Read about how we use cookies.

Table 1 Distribution of defense budget under Ben Ali [28] The Tunisian military felt it had not received sufficient material to carry out its mandate [29] and needed more basic comfort and amenities like sleeping bags for its troops. You may hide this message. Armies and internal security forces.

Honorable Mention — Disaggregating the Coercive Apparatus: YIRA members automatically receive the update. Sectarianism and coup-proofing strategies in Bahrain. Table 1 Distribution of defense budget under Ben Ali [28]. The China Quarterly As we shall see, compared to the military, internal cohesion made defection more necessary while regime dependence made defection more practically viable for the military. Please see the “Submission Guidelines” tab for further information.


We will interpret your continued use of this site as your acceptance of our use of cookies. The main argument here concerns the top leadership of each of the organs.

Include unauthenticated results too may include “spam” Enter a search phrase. However, the internal variation in regime collapse and survival observed in the region confirms earlier analyses that the comportment of the coercive apparatus, especially its varying will to repress, is pivotal to determining the durability of the authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, in political terms, just like the Tunisian military, as the most trusted public institution, the Egyptian forces expected a forthcoming role as the arbiter of the revolution—they would direct their own economic fate.

Here’s an example of what they look like: Secondly, cruelty against hordes of unarmed civilians was not new to the Interior Ministry and its forces.